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Consent — the weakest link in online privacy
protection1
Dr Dan Jerker B. Svantesson BOND UNIVERSITY
Having carried out an assessment of the major weaknesses Australia’s law contain in relation to the
protection of e-consumers,2 it has become clear to the author that consent is a crucially important
weak spot with far-reaching implications. While it affects a range of areas, the focus here is placed
on its impact within privacy law.
Introduction
The relevance of the concept of consent is typically
such that consent works like a miracle cure for any
alleged privacy violation. If a data controller has obtained
the data subjects’ consent, it may, for example, use
and/or disclose personal data it otherwise would not be
entitled to use and/or disclose.3 Further, it may transfer
personal data to a third country where such a transfer
would not otherwise be allowed.4
Despite its central position in Australian privacy law,
legitimate questions have been raised for years regard-
ing the appropriateness of how consent is gained from
data subjects.
Focusing onAustralian privacy law, this article argues
that the current approach taken to consent is unwork-
able, and that the problems with the concept of consent
are amplified in the Internet context. It then proposes an
alternative.
What is consent?
There is extensive literature on the concept of con-
sent. This is hardly surprising bearing in mind its central
position in several areas of law, including medical law,
criminal law and privacy law.
For our purposes here, it suffices to refer to how the
concept of consent is applied within Australia’s Privacy
Act 1988 (Cth). While the Act itself merely makes clear
that the concept includes both express and implied
consent, Guidelines issued by the Office of the Federal
Privacy Commissioner provide more information:
Consent means voluntary agreement to some act, practice
or purpose. It has two elements: knowledge of the matter
agreed to, and voluntary agreement. Consent can be express
or implied. Express consent is given explicitly, either orally
or in writing. Implied consent arises where consent may
reasonably be inferred in the circumstances from the
conduct of the individual and the organisation. Consent is
invalid if there is extreme pressure or coercion.5
The problems
Looking at the concept of consent from a regulator’s
or a privacy advocate’s perspective, the problem is that
consent can easily be obtained and works like a magic
cure for even the most serious privacy violation. In other
words, consent — while virtually meaningless as a
procedural protective function — thwarts the protection
afforded by substantive privacy law.
Looked at from the perspective of a business opera-
tor, the problem with consent is that it may be costly to
obtain and difficult to keep track of, leading to additional
operational costs.
Combining these two observations, the author con-
cludes that the consent framework found in privacy
regulations around the world is costly for business and
has the effect of negating the positive effect of substan-
tive privacy laws.
The possible solutions
The most obvious solution would be to re-define the
meaning of consent to something more appropriate. At a
minimum any such definition should specify that valid
consent in the privacy setting must be:
1. Sufficiently informed;
2. Clearly identifiable;
3. Given freely; and
4. Retractable and preferably variable.
The second and the fourth of these requirements are
relatively easily dealt with. Consent must be identifiable
in the sense that the data controller must be able to point
to some particular express or implied indication of
consent. The main problem with this arises where the
data subject is made to consent to a diverse range of
matters as a package, rather than given the chance to
consent to some things but not others. Further, consent
must be retractable so as to give the data subject the
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chance to change her/his mind (obviously such a change
of mind may come with consequences such as the data
controller ceasing to provide a particular service as long
as such matters are specified at the outset).
The application of the first and the third requirements
present greater challenges. Assessing exactly what is
required for consent to be sufficiently informed will
never be an easy task; particularly as it varies depending
on what the consent relates to. However, the author
suggests that, for consent to be sufficiently informed to
be valid, the data subject must, for example, be informed
of:
• details about what they are consenting to such as
to whom the data may be transferred and under
which circumstances such a transfer may take
place, the purposes for which the data will be
used, and in the case of cross-border data trans-
fers, the country or countries which are the desti-
nation(s) of the transfer; and
• generally what are the likely implications of con-
senting to the use, disclosure and/or transfer.
Also, assessing whether consent was given freely
may be difficult in some cases as many instances of a
data subject consenting to a particular type of data
processing involve the data subject being presented with
a “take it or leave it” style choice.
Taking account of the difficulties associated with
ensuring that consent is sufficiently informed, clearly
identifiable and given freely, and bearing in mind the
operational costs associated with collecting and tracking
consent, it may be that an alternative must be sought.
One such alternative would be to steer away com-
pletely from a consent-focused regulation to a regulatory
model with a clearer and firmer definition of what type
of data processing is allowed and what type of data
processing is not allowed. In other words, as long as the
regulation is sufficiently protective of the data subjects’
needs, there would be no need for the data subject to
consent to the processing. The problem with this approach
is obvious; to avoid completely stifling creative data
processing practices, such a regulatory model would
need to either predict the future or be drafted in such
general terms that it could not possibly provide the
guidance needed.
A more suitable approach would be for privacy
advocates, and more importantly, regulators such as the
various data protection authorities, to make better use of
existing abuse regulation found in general consumer
protection law to assess whether the consent given in a
particular instance should be accepted. That way, we can
keep the consent-focused regulatory model of today, but
ensure that it is applied in a more meaningful manner.
Like the laws of many other jurisdictions, Australian
law contains a range of consumer protection provisions
that could either be applied directly to assessing whether
the consent given in a particular instance should be
binding upon the data subject or not. For example,
s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) states, in
its first sub-section, that: “A corporation shall not, in
trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or
possible supply of goods or services to a person, engage
in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscio-
nable”.
This provision could be used to address those instances
where the data subjects consent was not given freely, or
was not sufficiently informed. After all, in such situa-
tions, it would be unconscionable for the data controller
to rely on the consent given.
While this provision has its limitations, the absolute
majority of instances in which a data subject consents to
data processing involve the data controller supplying
goods or services to the data subject. Further, as the
reference to “corporations” is not restricted by the
enormously wide exemptions placed on the application
of the Privacy Act (eg that Act excludes small busi-
nesses) this provision can be used where the Privacy Act
does not even apply.
Another example of general consumer protection
legislation that may prove useful in providing guidance
on the issue of what constitutes valid consent is found in
the Trade Practices Act’s regulation of unfair contracts
provisions. Inspired by the European Union’s useful
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair
terms in consumer contracts, Australia has finally intro-
duced similar provisions dealing with unfair contracts.
This recent amendment to the Trade PracticesAct 1974
(Cth) makes clear that, where an individual acquires
goods or services predominantly for personal, domestic
or household use or consumption, clauses of a standard
form contract are void if they are unfair.6
In assessing whether or not such clauses are unfair,
attention is given to matters such as the extent to which
the term is transparent.7 Further, a term is unfair if:
(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in the
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the
contract; and
(b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect
the legitimate interests of the party who would be
advantaged by the term; and
(c) it would cause detriment (whether financial or
otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or
relied on.8
Overly broad contractual provisions allowing the data
controller to, for example, use or disclose the data in
unspecific manners would certainly seem to fit squarely
within this provision.
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Concluding remarks
Summarising the above, our rather sad conclusion is
that the concept of consent — so central to privacy
regulation around the world — simply does not work. It
makes sense in theory, but the practical application of
the concept illuminates its flaws. The consent frame-
work found in privacy regulations around the world is
costly for business and has the effect of negating the
positive effect of substantive privacy laws.
In light of this, the author has argued that it is time to
re-visit and re-design the concept of consent. Preferably
this should be done de novo and the author has suggested
some parameters for a “new” definition of consent. As
an alternative, the author has suggested that, the very
least that should be done is for various data, and
consumer, protection authorities to make better use of
general consumer protection provisions that impact on
consent. For Australia, that would also require the
AustralianCompetition andConsumerCommission (ACCC)
to start taking a greater interest in privacy.
While such a development doubtlessly involves a
degree of overlap between the activities of several
governmental bodies, it must be recognised that privacy
lies at the heart of consumer protection.
Dr. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,
Bond University.
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